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NSC FOR LOOK  
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2019

TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START  
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON EGOTIATIONS, GENEVA  
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION MEETING,  
DECEMBER 15, 2009

REF: GENEVA 01091 (SFO-GVA-VII-067)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States  
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

11. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-146.

12. (U) Meeting Date: December 15, 2009  
Time: 10:30 A.M. - 11:30 A.M.  
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

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SUMMARY  
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13. (S) A meeting on Conversion or Elimination was held at the U.S. Mission on December 15. Mr. Siemon opened the meeting by requesting clarification on notifications of ICBMs and SLBMs exiting the Votkinsk Production Facility. Col Ryzhkov promised to consider a U.S. proposal on text for such notifications. Mr. Elliott handed over new U.S.-proposed joint draft text (JDT) for the Conversion or Elimination, Part Three of the Protocol, with one edited sentence and one paragraph added on launch canister elimination procedures. The meeting moved into a discussion on inspection quotas and then joint basing of nuclear-equipped heavy bombers with non-nuclear-equipped heavy bombers. Both issues sparked discussion and permitted Elliott to reiterate U.S. positions on both issues. End Summary.

14. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Where is the Exit Notification?; Some Really Small Changes; "Inspection Activities" and

Quotas; and Joint Basing of Heavy Bombers.

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WHERE IS THE EXIT NOTIFICATION?  
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¶15. (S) Siemon opened the meeting by requesting clarification regarding notifications on the exit of ICBMs and SLBMs from the Votkinsk Production Facility. He said the U.S. understanding from the Russian counter-proposal was that notifications were to be provided 48 hours in advance of the exit of ICBMs and SLBMs from the facility (Reftel). That notification, however, was not contained in the list of notifications. Additionally, Siemon clarified that the United States proposed that the following information be included in the notification: type of ballistic missile (ICBM or SLBM); unique identifier (UID) for the ballistic missile; an indication of the intended location of the ballistic missile; and the ballistic missile's estimated arrival date.

Begin Text of Russian document, Proposal of the Russian Federation on Fundamental Issues of the New START, November 28, 2009:

The Russian side shall provide, 48 hours in advance, notification of the exit of an ICBM from the Votkinsk production facility. The U.S. side shall provide, 48 hours in advance, analogous notifications of the exit of ICBMs and SLBMs from production facilities for solid fuel missiles. An appropriate notification of the arrival of a missile at an

ICBM base, SLBM base or at a location for non-deployed missiles shall be provided.

End text.

¶16. (S) Siemon highlighted that he had been instructed to put the notification in the Notification Part of the Protocol. He suggested that the appropriate location for the provision in the Notification Part would be in Section II because once the ballistic missile arrived at its destination the possessing Party would need to transmit a Format 3 notification indicating the ballistic missile arrived. Siemon requested the Russian side's concept for such a notification and where to place it in the structure of the Notification Part of the Protocol.

¶17. (S) Ryzhkov responded that he understood the U.S. rationale on the matter and proposed that the U.S. side prepare a written proposal and place it in Section II. Meanwhile, Ryzhkov said he would report back to the Russian delegation and study the proposal and that their response could be discussed at the next Notification Working Group meeting. Siemon agreed to prepare a written proposal and provide a translated copy to the Russian side. Siemon also maintained that there would need to be text in a treaty article which Ryzhkov deferred comment until he read the U.S. proposal.

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SOME REALLY SMALL CHANGES  
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¶18. (S) Elliott handed over the latest JDT on Part Three to the Protocol regarding the Conversion or Elimination Procedures. He reviewed the Section I, paragraph 3 U.S.-proposed change. (Begin comment: Text changed to read: "The Parties may periodically verify such a use in accordance with Part Nine of the Protocol." End comment.) Elliott said that the agreed statement described the procedures to do periodic inspections and that the part of the Protocol dealing with the agreed statement was Part Nine.

¶19. (S) Section V, paragraph 5 was a new paragraph added to clarify the elimination procedures for launch canisters for ICBMs and SLBMs. Elliott stated that once the elimination

procedures were complete, the launch canisters could be reused for purposes not inconsistent with the treaty but shall not be transferred to third parties outside of Russia. Specifically, Elliott said that the concept and wording associated with "separating" as part of the launch canister elimination procedures would remain unchanged. Ryzhkov responded that the Russian delegation had discussed the issue and that he believed Russia would accept the U.S. proposal to assume the obligation to not use the launch canisters for purposes inconsistent with the treaty. Furthermore, Ryzhkov believed the Russian delegation would accept the obligation not to transfer to third parties.

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"INSPECTION ACTIVITIES" AND QUOTAS  
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¶10. (S) Elliott alerted Ryzhkov to the fact that the word

"inspection" was still being discussed rather than "exhibition" as used in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. To resolve the confusion the Inspection Protocol Working Group began using the term "inspection activities" which incorporated both inspections and exhibitions. Ryzhkov said the term "inspection activities" was not agreed and that the day before Amb Antonov had briefed the Russian delegation that both heads of delegation agreed to use the word "inspection" in Article XI. Elliott said he thought the issue could be resolved by the Conforming Group.

¶11. (S) Ryzhkov stated that the Russian side had broadened the inspection framework considerably over the course of the negotiations. He said the Russian President agreed on the specific number of inspections and noted that Russia had taken incremental steps toward the U.S. position. Elliott replied that he continued to be told that if we do not agree to a reasonable number of inspections, the United States would not sign a Treaty. This statement elicited a slightly more spirited response from Ryzhkov, who said the United States was demanding too many inspections. He went on to provide a mathematical description of the inspection load under START and the U.S.-proposed inspection load under START Follow-on. According to Ryzhkov's math, the United States was proposing a two fold increase in inspections as opposed to START, which he deemed unacceptable. Elliott stated the U.S. position that if an elimination inspection is captured under an inspection quota then that would not be an "actual" right under the treaty. That is precisely why the United States proposed that elimination inspections be captured under a limited number of exhibitions which would not increase Type One or Type Two quotas nor load factor of Russian operational bases. Elliott explained that the opportunity always existed for both Parties to perform eliminations in groups in order to reduce the number of total exhibitions. Once again Elliott reiterated that should Russia continue to insist that elimination inspections remain subject to an inspection quota, the United States would be incapable of ratifying the treaty.

¶12. (S) Ryzhkov commented that the rationale that the exhibitions would not increase the load of Russian personnel was unconvincing, given the travel days prior to and after the overnight stay and the inspection time. Elliott countered that it was based simply on whether the United States could confirm or verify the act of elimination and those charged with that task would testify to the treaty's verifiability. He added that in some cases national technical means (NTM) of verification was completely sufficient for certain systems (for silos, submarines and launch canisters) but for other systems (ICBMs, SLBMs and mobile launchers) the United States believed they could not be verified by NTM. Elliott said that this condition led to the proposed number of opportunities to verify. Elliott deferred further discussion to Mr. Warner and Col Ilin.

¶13. (S) Elliott captured the historical context of how the United States and Russia came into the B-1B heavy bomber basing conundrum under START. The bottom line is that B-1Bs

are based at the U.S. conversion or elimination facility, they are converted into heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, and then placed in visit status back at Ellsworth and Dyess Air Force Bases (AFB). Elliott conveyed that the United States will convert a number of B-52Hs into heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments but lacked the ramp space to separate them from B-52Hs equipped for nuclear armaments (e.g., non-nuclear from nuclear). He suggested that at Barksdale AFB there will be a time when both heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments will be based along with heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. This condition makes it unacceptable for the United States to agree on a prohibition on co-location or joint basing of heavy bombers. Elliott stated the United States could not agree to something that it was incapable of doing. Ryzhkov remarked that he would report this to the Russian delegation that morning.

¶14. (S) Documents provided:

- UNITED STATES:

- U.S.-Proposed Joint Draft Text, Part Three:  
Conversion or Elimination Procedures, December 14, 2009.

¶15. (U) Participants:

UNITED STATES

Mr. Elliott  
Lt Col Comeau  
Mr. Siemon  
Ms. Smith (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ryzhkov  
Ms. Komshilova (Int)

¶16. (U) Gottemoeller sends.

GRIFFITHS